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Abstract
International calls for registering all trials involving humans and for sharing the results, and sometimes also the raw
data and the trial protocols, have increased in recent years. Such calls have come, for example, from the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Health Organization (WHO), the US
National Institutes of Heath, the US Congress, the European Commission, the European ombudsman, journal
editors, The Cochrane Collaboration, and several funders, for example the UK Medical Research Council, the
Wellcome Trust, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Hewlett Foundation.
Calls for data sharing have mostly been restricted to publicly-funded research, but I argue that the distinction
between publicly-funded and industry-funded research is an artificial and irrelevant one, as the interests of the
patients must override commercial interests.
I also argue why it is a moral imperative to render all results from all trials involving humans, also healthy
volunteers, publicly available. Respect for trial participants who often run a personal and unknown risk by
participating in trials requires that they - and therefore also the society at large that they represent - be seen as
the ultimate owners of trial data.
Data sharing would lead to tremendous benefits for patients, progress in science, and rational use of healthcare
resources based on evidence we can trust. The harmful consequences are minor compared to the benefits. It has
been amply documented that the current situation, with selective reporting of favorable research and biased data
analyses being the norm rather than the exception, is harmful to patients and has led to the death of tens of
thousands of patients that could have been avoided.
National and supranational legislation is needed to make data sharing happen as guidelines and other voluntary
agreements do not work. I propose the contents of such legislation and of appropriate sanctions to hold
accountable those who refuse to share their data.
Background
International calls for registering all trials involving
humans and for sharing the results - and sometimes also
the raw data and the trial protocols - have increased in
recent years. Calls for such data sharing have mostly been
restricted to publicly-funded research, but I argue here
that the distinction between publicly-funded and industry-
funded research is an artificial and irrelevant one, as the
interests of the patients must override commercial inter-
ests. The main focus of this paper is therefore drug trials.
I also argue why data sharing would lead to tremen-
dous benefits for patients, progress in science, and
rational use of healthcare resources based on evidence
we can trust, and that the harmful consequences are
minor compared to the benefits.
My paper aims at convincing those who have doubts
about whether we should share our research data. It is less
focused on practical or legal difficulties, which can always
be resolved if there is a willingness to resolve them, but I
do suggest the introduction of a new law about data shar-
ing and sanctions in case the law is violated.
The fundamental problem is that, with rare exceptions,
we do not know what the true benefits and harms of our
interventions are. This may seem counterintuitive, given
the existence of hundreds of thousands of randomized
trials and thousands of updated systematic Cochrane
reviews of trials [1].
There are several reasons why doctors are unable to
choose the best treatments for their patients and the
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biggest obstacle for evidence-based healthcare with pru-
dent use of resources is that research results are being
reported selectively.
Another important problem is that the drug industry is
not obliged by law to compare its new drugs with the best
existing drugs but can obtain marketing approval by com-
paring with placebo. It even suffices to demonstrate a sta-
tistically significant effect in two placebo-controlled trials,
even though the drug might not have worked in many
other placebo-controlled trials. Financial success would be
difficult if a well-conducted trial showed that a new expen-
sive drug is not any better than an old cheap one, or is
worse. Head-to-head comparisons of drugs can be subject
to bias, in all phases of a trial, in design, analysis and
reporting [2-8], and can cause the reported results to be
misleading. Data sharing cannot resolve all problems, but
it would make it possible to demonstrate many of the hid-
den flaws in the research process.
Selective reporting
Comparisons of published drug trials with unpublished
trials or other data available at drug regulatory agencies
have shown that the benefits of a number of drugs have
been much overrated [6,9,10] and the harms much under-
rated [11]. This is a universal problem that has been docu-
mented across many different drug classes [10]. The effect
of antidepressants, for example, was 32% larger in the pub-
lished trials than in all trials submitted to the US Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) [9].
Another review of antidepressants showed that the sta-
tistical analyses in published reports were considerably
more favorable for the drugs than those required by law to
be submitted to the drug regulatory agency [6]. The pub-
lished analyses were mainly ‘per protocol analyses,’ where
patients who drop out of the trials, for example because of
lack of effect or adverse effects, are not accounted for.
Those required by law are ‘intention to treat analyses,’
which are far more reliable, as they include these patients.
The effect of antidepressants is relatively small [12] and
they have important adverse effects that, however, to a
large extent have been hidden. Adverse events of suicidal
thoughts and behavior, and even suicide attempts, in
patients taking antidepressant drugs have gone unreported
by the events being coded as emotional lability, admissions
to hospital, treatment failures, noncompliant patients, or
drop-outs [11,13]. Furthermore, several companies were
reported to have added suicidal events to the placebo
group, although they had not occurred while the patients
were on placebo [11,14]. Only full access to trial data can
reveal these problems.
When the UK National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence (NICE) was drafting guidelines for childhood
depression they observed that, based on the published
trials, they would recommend antidepressants, but based
on all the trials, including the unpublished ones, they
would not [15]. NICE does not have a legal right to access
the unpublished reports at the UK Medicines and Health-
care products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), but in this
case, the Agency made the reports publicly available.
Similar examples abound in all therapeutic areas and
studies have shown that even for those trials that do get
published, trial outcomes are often reported selectively, or
the data are massaged and changed until they say some-
thing positive [2-11,14,16-21]. Some of this was revealed
in US court cases [20,21], and some because scientific-
ethical committees or public funders made trial protocols
available for researchers wanting to compare them with
published reports [16-18].
Although it seems to be less common, selective report-
ing is also widespread in clinical trials performed by aca-
demics independently of the drug industry [16,17]. When
the results of three published trials comparing two techni-
ques for hernia surgery were combined, one technique
was significantly better than the other, but when the trial-
ists shared their unpublished data, there were 13 trials and
the second technique was now significantly better than the
first [22].
Consequences of selective reporting
Selective reporting can have disastrous consequences. For
example, class 1 anti-arrhythmic drugs likely caused the
premature death of about 50,000 Americans each year in
the 1980s [23]. An early trial found nine deaths on the
drug and only one on placebo, but it was never published
[24].
More recently, the anti-arthritis drug, rofecoxib (Vioxx),
a COX-2 inhibitor, likely caused about 100,000 unneces-
sary heart attacks in the US alone [25,26], corresponding
to about 10,000 deaths, which could largely have been
avoided by using other, equally effective drugs causing less
harm. Several drug companies misrepresented the risk of
harm with their COX-2 inhibitors. Cases of myocardial
infarction and deaths with rofecoxib, for example, were
missing in reports of the pivotal trials [27-30] and Merck
selectively targeted doctors who raised questions about
rofecoxib and pressured some of them through deans and
department chairs, often with the hint of loss of funding
[31].
Pfizer denied that celecoxib causes heart attacks at an
FDA hearing in 2005 [32], despite having unpublished
evidence to the contrary [32] and still said the evidence
was not conclusive in 2009 in information to patients
invited to take part in a trial [33].
Misleading 6-month data in two pivotal trials of cele-
coxib, funded by Pharmacia, were published [34,35]. The
publications showed that celecoxib induced fewer gastro-
intestinal ulcers than its competitors, but it was later
revealed that the trials ran for longer than 6 months, and
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analyses done according to the trial protocol showed no
advantage of celecoxib [34]. Despite the fact that only 16
out of at least 27 trials of celecoxib were included in the
relevant FDA reports [36], independent researchers who
had access to FDA data nevertheless substantiated the
cardiovascular harms of celecoxib [37].
Non-transparent data on lethal harms
A drug company applying for marketing authorization for
a new drug often submits tens of thousands of pages
describing the results of its clinical trials, the clinical study
reports. Drug regulatory agencies do not have the capacity
to scrutinize so much material and therefore need to trust
the companies’ handling of the data and the summaries
and tables in their reports.
However, several drug companies have been reported to
have hidden studies and results showing that their drugs
cause lethal harms [38-43].
The US Freedom of Information Act has played an
important role in reducing the exposure of the population
to potentially harmful drugs. In 2005, an FDA advisory
committee recommended approval of an antidiabetes
drug, muraglitazar, but independent researchers who ana-
lyzed the submitted trial data found that the original ana-
lyses supporting the FDA application were flawed, and
that the drug was harmful [44,45].
Rosiglitazone is another example. Antidiabetes drugs are
supposed to lower cardiovascular mortality but rosiglita-
zone increases it. This was known by GlaxoSmithKline for
many years but the company failed to warn the regulatory
authorities and the public. Instead, it intimidated physi-
cians raising uncomfortable questions about the drug [46].
In 1999, the company, then known as SmithKlineBeec-
ham, completed a trial that found more cardiac problems
with rosiglitazone than with pioglitazone [47]. ‘These data
should not see the light of day to anyone outside of GSK,’
according to an email from a SmithKline executive, that
was reported in the New York Times [47].
In 2004, the WHO sent GlaxoSmithKline an alert
about cardiac events and the company performed a
meta-analysis that confirmed this, which it sent to the
FDA and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) in
2006, but the drug regulatory agencies did not make the
findings public because of the proprietary nature of
companies’ trial results [48].
Also in 2004, the Attorney General of New York State
accused GlaxoSmithKline for ‘repeated and persistent
fraud’ in relation to concealing harms of its antidepres-
sant drug, paroxetine [49]. A subsequent legal settle-
ment required the company to post results of its clinical
trials [50]. This enabled independent researchers to have
a closer look at rosiglitazone, and in a 2007 meta-analy-
sis of 42 trials, 27 of which were unpublished, they
showed that the drug causes myocardial infarction and
cardiovascular death [51].
When these researchers submitted their paper for publi-
cation, an academic peer reviewer broke the rules and
faxed the manuscript to GlaxoSmithKline [52]. The com-
pany unblinded its ongoing RECORD trial, that the EMA
had required the company to carry out because of cardio-
vascular safety concerns [52]. However, Home et al.,
funded by GlaxoSmithKline, published a preliminary ana-
lysis electronically in the New England Journal of Medicine
only two weeks after the independent researchers pub-
lished their meta-analysis in the same journal. Home et al.
regarded their findings as ‘inconclusive’ [53], and when
final results were published in The Lancet two years later
[54], they appeared to be false [52]. Since the 1950s, FDA
rules have required drug companies to turn over all indivi-
dual patient case reports from their clinical studies. This
permits re-analysis of how each case was coded [48], and
it enabled Marciniak, an FDA scientist, to scrutinize the
RECORD trial data [55]. The EMA had accepted the com-
pany’s findings that the risk of complications was the
same, 14.5% for rosiglitazone and 14.4% for the compara-
tor [53]. However, Marciniak studied 549 case reports and
found many missing cases of cardiac problems that
favored rosiglitazone four to one and an increased risk of
myocardial infarction [55]. For one patient, there were
1,438 pages, and for most of the other 4,500 patients there
were several hundred pages, making a review of all case
reports a huge task [48]. Marciniak concluded that the
case report forms are essential for understanding a study
and found that also in the RECORD trial, rosiglitazone
increased cardiovascular risk [48,55].
Rosiglitazone was suspended in Europe in September
2009 whereas it remained on the market in the US. In an
unprecedented move, the FDA invited additional people
to its 2010 advisory committee meeting - to decide if the
drug should remain on the market - who had been
involved in the 2007 meeting but were no longer active
members of either committee and some of whom had
previously voted in favor of the drug remaining on sale
[56].
Oseltamivir (Tamiflu) against influenza
Oseltamivir (Tamiflu) against influenza illustrates that
lack of access to full clinical trial data can be extremely
wasteful. During the rather mild influenza epidemic in
2009, European governments stock piled Tamiflu. Tami-
flu and similar drugs were promoted by the WHO as a
key part of influenza prevention and treatment, but
most of the drug supplies were never used [57].
The belief in the efficacy of Tamiflu hinged on trials
that were only published as a company-sponsored meta-
analysis. When independent researchers succeeded to
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get access to some of the data it turned out that the
effect of the drug in preventing serious complications,
above all bacterial pneumonia, was unclear, and that bil-
lions of Euros had been wasted [58]. These researchers
concluded that we should ‘regard any industry spon-
sored trial published in journals as marketing, unless
proved otherwise’ [58]. Indeed it was revealed that the
scientific papers on Tamiflu were not written by the
academics listed in the byline but by medical writers
that liaised directly with Roche’s marketing department
(although at least one of the authors denied that their
paper was ghost-written) and who were told that they
had to come to the conclusion that Tamiflu was the
answer to the influenza epidemic [57].
It was also remarkable that the EMA stated in its sum-
mary of product characteristics that Tamiflu reduced
influenza complications significantly (P = 0.001), whereas
the FDA gave the opposite view when it stated on the pro-
duct label that Tamiflu had not been shown to prevent
complications [57]. If Tamiflu does not reduce complica-
tions, there is little rationale for using this expensive drug.
International calls for data sharing
Sharing knowledge has led to tremendous benefits for our
societies. One need only think of Google and Wikipedia,
which contains more than 3.5 million articles and would
amount to 1,400 volumes if printed in the same format as
the Encyclopaedia Brittanica [59].
Few things matter more to people than their health. It is
therefore counterintuitive that researchers working with
patients are generally very secretive about their data. In
genetics, molecular biology, the social sciences and in
many other areas of the life sciences, researchers routinely
share their data [60].
A public that pays for most medical research through
taxes and public funds is becoming increasingly puzzled
by the barriers that deny access to the results of that
research [61]. This had led to calls for transparency and
access to the research protocols, the results and the raw
data from major international organizations, politicians,
funders, editors of medical journals and researchers, parti-
cularly during the last decade.
Appendix 1 describes such calls from the ministerial
meetings in Mexico City and Bamako, the World Bank,
the WHO, the OECD, the European Commission, the UK
National Institute for Health Research, the Wellcome
Trust, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Hewlett
Foundation, the US Congress, the US National Institutes
of Health (NIH), the US National Science Foundation, the
US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
Science, Nature journals, The Lancet, British Medical Jour-
nal (BMJ), Annals of Internal Medicine, The Public Library
of Science (PLoS) Journals, and The Cochrane Collabora-
tion [62-87].
The European Commission favors open access publish-
ing, where the authors pay for publication while access is
free for the users. It observed that journal subscription
prices increased substantially above inflation level, which
is particularly acute for less well-endowed institutions and
in countries with lower income levels. In addition, several
big publishers cut access to thousands of journals in poor
countries provided through the WHO-initiated HINARI
(Health InterNetwork Access to Research Initiative
scheme, worsening considerably the global inequities in
health and healthcare research [88].
Drug regulatory agencies
Drug regulatory agencies have been the notable exception
to these calls for data sharing. They have generally not
been willing to share data of pivotal importance for public
health and rational decision making with the citizens.
Before 2010, it was impossible for researchers to get access
to unpublished trial reports and their corresponding pro-
tocols from the EMA, although, according to Regulation
(EC) No 1049/2001, a basic principle in the European
Union is to allow its citizens the widest possible access to
the documents its agencies possess [89,90]. This openness
‘enables citizens to participate more closely in the deci-
sion-making process and guarantees that the administra-
tion enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and
more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system.’ It
also ‘contributes to strengthening the principles of democ-
racy and respect for fundamental rights’ [89,90].
In 2010, a colleague and I from The Nordic Cochrane
Centre were granted access to trial protocols and clinical
study reports for two anti-obesity drugs at the EMA but it
took us three years and a complaint to the European
ombudsman to get there. The EMA put forward several
arguments to avoid disclosing the documents: protection
of commercial interests, no over-riding public interest, the
administrative burden involved, or the worthlessness of
the data to us after the EMA had redacted them [90].
The ombudsman inspected the files at the EMA and
concluded that the documents did not contain commer-
cially confidential information. After he accused the
EMA of maladministration in a press release, three years
after our request, the EMA reversed its stance. The EMA
now gave the impression that it had favored disclosure all
the time and agreed with the ombudsman’s reasoning.
The ombudsman did not take a definitive position
regarding whether the presence of ‘personal data’ could
entitle EMA to redact the documents. He noted that they
do not identify patients by name but by their identification
and test center numbers, and he concluded that the only
‘personal data’ are those identifying the study authors and
principal investigators.
This is very important progress for patient safety.
Researchers can now get access to the detailed lists of
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individual patient data in clinical study reports, enabling
them to perform an independent interpretation of the
harm of drugs.
Our case has set an important precedent, and we recom-
mend that FDA and other drug regulatory agencies follow
suit [90]. Only a few years ago, researchers found that
many pages for a COX-2 inhibitor, valdecoxib, had been
deleted from FDA documents, when they were allowed
access, because they contained ‘trade secrets and/or confi-
dential information that is not disclosable’ [36]. Suicides,
occurring while patients take a drug with the aim of pre-
venting suicides, should not be regarded as a trade secret
[91]. Furthermore, indirect patient identifiers such as body
weight, blood pressure, asthma severity or descriptions of
harm, are not, in isolation, ‘personal data.’
I am convinced that virtually all trial participants would
be interested in letting others have access to their anomy-
mized data, given that this enables us to get a more truth-
ful view of the benefits and harm of drugs and other
interventions. Furthermore, despite theoretical concerns
about the possibility of identifying individuals in shared
data sets, no breaches of confidentiality have yet been
recorded in anonymized data sets, as far as I am aware.
Data sharing will lead to greater transparency in drug
regulatory processes, which is much needed, and should
reduce potentially lethal consequences for the patients.
Data access adds considerably to the essential role drug
regulatory agencies have as a guardian of public health, as
many citizens have the interest, skills and time to scruti-
nize the clinical documentation to a degree and detail
drug regulatory agencies cannot do. In fact, they are under
political pressure to work faster for the benefit of the com-
panies and the national economies. This focus on regula-
tory speed rather than on quality and patient safety is
relatively recent [92,93], but it has already had lethal con-
sequences [94]. Of drugs approved in 1997 to 2000, 5.3%
were later withdrawn from the market because of serious
harm, compared with 1.6% of drugs approved in 1993 to
1996 [92,94]. Drugs approved just before the official FDA
review deadline were more likely to be withdrawn from
the market than drugs approved after the deadline [95,96].
In 2009, the FDA admitted that its former commis-
sioner had unduly influenced the decision process for
approving a patch for knee injuries [97]. FDA scientists
had repeatedly and unanimously over many years
decided that a particular medical device was unsafe, but
after extreme, unusual and persistent pressure from four
congressmen, FDA managers overruled their own scien-
tists and approved the device. These congressmen had
received campaign contributions from the company
marketing the device [97].
When an associate director in the FDA’s Office of Drug
Safety, David Graham, showed that rofecoxib increases the
risk of serious coronary heart disease, his study was pulled
at the last minute from The Lancet after one of his direc-
tors had raised unfounded allegations of scientific miscon-
duct with the editor [98,99]. The study was later published
[100], but just a week before Merck withdrew rofecoxib
from the market, senior people at the FDA questioned
why Graham studied the harm of the drug, because the
FDA had no regulatory problems with it, and they also
wanted him to stop doing this [100]. Graham needed con-
gressional protection to avoid getting fired from the FDA
[100]. Other safety officers at the FDA have also been pre-
vented from presenting their findings of the lethal harms
of drugs [39,93,98]. A 2006 survey showed that 70% of
FDA scientists are not confident that products approved
by the FDA are safe [101].
Research ethics
It is important to note that parts of the Nuremberg code
and the Declaration of Helsinki are not only regarded as
universal codes of ethics, but are to be considered a
‘customary international law norm’ [102].
Selective reporting violates the Declaration of Helsinki
[103], which says that, ‘Authors have a duty to make pub-
licly available the results of their research on human sub-
jects.’ Failing to do so is unethical for a number of reasons.
When less favorable results and adverse effects are not
published, the standard of care inevitably suffers. Further,
informed consent forms do not tell trial participants that
the sponsor may decide not to publish. In fact, they are
usually told that the data they provide will add to existing
knowledge, which is misleading because the chance of
publication depends on the magnitude and direction of
the results [16-19]. Thus, patients are being exploited for
commercial or career gains, that is used as a means to an
end.
The Declaration says that, ‘Medical research involving
human subjects must ... be based on a thorough knowl-
edge of the scientific literature.’ If the knowledge base is
incomplete, some patients will suffer and die unnecessa-
rily. Researchers may for example include patients in trials
of similar compounds as one that has been shown to be
deadly because they are unaware of this [24]. An incom-
plete knowledge base also leads to redundant research,
which by its very nature is unethical, and informed con-
sent is an illusion when patients and their doctors can
only get access to biased information. New research
should not be done unless, at the time it is initiated, the
questions it proposes to address cannot be answered satis-
factorily with existing evidence [104].
Clinical research relies on the patients’ altruistic will-
ingness to contribute to advancing science for the public
good [105], but research can only be a public good, if the
public can see the data. It is curious that trial participants
are willing to share data about themselves with the inves-
tigators when the investigators are unwilling to share
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these data with trial participants and others but regard
them as their personal property. This double standard
expresses a lack of respect for the trial participants,
which is particularly pronounced in industry-sponsored
trials. A review of trial protocols showed that the sponsor
either owned the data, needed to approve the manuscript,
or both, in half the cases, and none of these constraints
were stated in any of the trial publications [106]. Even
researchers who have contracts permitting them to pub-
lish, or who do not collaborate with the drug industry,
may face legal threats if they wish to publish papers that
are not in the industry’s interest [107].
Such deliberations make it clear that it is a moral
imperative to render all results from all trials involving
humans, including healthy volunteers, publicly available.
This should apply to all research, for example also to phar-
macokinetic studies, as these could suggest that a drug
would be hazardous to use in the elderly or in certain
patient groups because of reduced drug metabolism.
Respect for trial participants who often run a personal
and unknown risk by participating requires that they, and
therefore also the society at large that they represent, be
seen as the ultimate owners of trial data. We should no
longer accept that data generated by patients are treated
as the private property of investigators or drug companies,
which aim to maximize their publication record or income
at the expense of the widest possible use of the data [60].
It is also unacceptable that in virtually all industry-spon-
sored trials, the only people who have seen the entire data
set are company employees.
Also, the trial protocols need to be publicly available.
Patients wishing to see the protocol or get a copy of it
when asked to participate in a trial usually cannot get it, as
the drug industry regards their protocols as confidential.
This confidentiality clause is unnecessary, as there is noth-
ing in a trial protocol that with any reasonable justification
can be regarded as commercially sensitive information
[16,90], for example there is nothing about how a drug is
manufactured.
Benefits of data sharing
Data sharing would lead to tremendous benefits. First, we
would become much better informed about what the true
benefits and harms of our interventions are, which would
lead to better results with less harms throughout
healthcare.
Second, the incentive for cheating would be much
reduced, as it would be a risky affair when others can
check the methods and calculations against the trial proto-
col and the raw data.
Third, the efficiency of healthcare research would be
much improved, as many important research questions
can be answered by using existing data, sparing
researchers and patients from collecting new data, and
saving funds for better purposes.
Fourth, access to raw data would make meta-analyses of
trials studying similar interventions and patient groups
much more reliable than if based on published summary
data. It would also allow exploratory analyses aimed at
identifying subgroups of patients where the treatment
would be particularly beneficial or where it might be
harmful, resulting in much more cost-effective and evi-
dence-based use of interventions, with large savings for
our societies.
Harms of data sharing
The most obvious harm of data sharing is that anyone
with an agenda could selectively interpret the data in a
way that furthers this agenda, for example plaintiffs’ law-
yers and anti-vaccination proponents. But consider the
alternative. Societies that have only one official version of
the truth are not societies we would like to live in. Equally
important, it is difficult to imagine a worse situation than
the status quo, where people with vested interests distort
the evidence for commercial or career gains so often that
it seems to be the norm, rather than the exception
[2-11,16-20]. By allowing free access to the data, this situa-
tion could only improve, as all those who wish to get clo-
ser to the truth than is currently possible would be able to
correct the published or institutionalized record.
Commercial interests
The arguments in favor of data sharing are so strong that
it would seem difficult to argue convincingly that we
should not share our data. There is something fundamen-
tally wrong with our ethics and priorities in healthcare if
commercial success is dependent on withholding data that
are needed for rational decision-making for patients, doc-
tors, other health professionals, and the politicians guard-
ing the public purse to which we all contribute.
Commercial interests seem to be incongruous with data
sharing. Publication rights on industry-initiated trials have
been constrained, which is inappropriate in clinical
research [106]. A scientist involved with European drug
regulation concluded that the only reasonable explanation
for the confidentiality arguments was that the ‘industry
wants to avoid any discussion about the amount and qual-
ity of the data they provide to justify marketing of drugs.
There is also the complicity of the regulatory agencies that
have access to the data, but avoid making it public, possi-
bly so as not to be questioned over their decisions?’ [108].
Access problems to industry data and publication bias
were highlighted when the German Institute for Quality
and Efficiency in Health Care (IQWiG) recently asked
Pfizer to submit a list of all trials performed with its
antidepressant drug, reboxetine. Pfizer delivered an
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incomplete list of trials, which from Pfizer’s point of
view were ‘suited for a benefit assessment’ [74]. When
independent researchers were eventually able to analyze
both published and unpublished data for a meta-analy-
sis, reboxetine, which is marketed in several European
Union (EU) countries, was found to be ineffective or
potentially harmful [109].
It has been argued that it is competition between
commercial companies that drives the discovery of new
treatments, but many major breakthroughs in healthcare
have come from publicly sponsored research [110,111].
The drug industry has been reported to spend more on
marketing than on research [110]. Moreover, drugs have
been sold at prices our societies can hardly afford, and
new drugs rarely offer substantial advantages over exist-
ing drugs and may cost several times, in one case 350
times, as much [112].
Arguments about competitiveness are unconvincing
for other reasons. As noted by The British House of
Commons Health Committee, society’s obligations
towards the patients who participate in trials, and all
other patients, must take precedence over commercial
interests [113]. And the competitiveness argument can
be used to support almost any doubtful practice, includ-
ing allowing selective publication of data and trials.
Further, I am aware of no evidence to suggest that
increased openness and transparency would negatively
impact drug development and profitability.
As a general principle, data sharing would not be anti-
competitive, as all companies would be affected equally
by it. It would only lead to competition at a higher ethi-
cal level, with the added benefits of more transparency,
less potential for fraud, more rational use of resources,
and less potential for harm.
It is also of note that drug development is deeply
dependent on, and a direct consequence of, patients’
willingness to volunteer for clinical trials. Through these
volunteers it might be discovered that a drug is too
hazardous to market, or the right marketing niche for a
product may be defined [11].
This means that it is artificial to distinguish between
industry-sponsored trials and publicly-sponsored trials,
although most calls for data sharing have only alluded
to the latter. The public is always a partner, contributing
not only trial participants, but also the infrastructure
needed for the research. Further, taxpayers contribute
substantially, both to research and by reimbursing drugs
once they are on the market.
The same rules ought to apply to industry-sponsored
trials as to publicly-sponsored trials, which would help
re-instate public trust in industry-sponsored research,
which is at a historically low level at present [113]. This
can only occur if the industry discloses all protocols,
results and raw data from all studies in humans,
including those in non-patient volunteers who may also
suffer the harm of the drugs [11,114]. In a 2006 phase 1
trial, six healthy volunteers treated with a very small
dose of a monoclonal antibody that had not caused pro-
blems in animals developed catastrophic systemic organ
failure. The investigators succeeded to rescue them all
despite their serious condition, but it required cardio-
pulmonary support at an intensive care unit [114].
The current lack of access to data also has untoward
consequences for the drug industry, as it leads to a huge
waste of resources. When failures with previous drugs
are kept secret, expensive development programs for
similar drugs can go on for years after they would have
been stopped if the data had been known. Openness
therefore has potential benefits for drug innovation.
Finally, it can be argued that if companies or academic
researchers are not willing to share their raw trial data,
it may raise a suspicion of improper research methods.
Their publications should therefore not be seen as
science but as advertisements, that is as vehicles for
financial gains or career advancement. We should strive
towards a future in which such trials, where raw data
are not available, are routinely excluded from systematic
reviews, meta-analyses and evidence-based guidelines.
At present, we may abstain from concluding anything
about the possible merits of the intervention, when data
are being withheld, as researchers recently did with
respect to oseltamivir and reboxetine (see above)
[57,74,109].
Academic interests
The primary concern of doctors and other health pro-
fessionals must be their patients. I cannot envision any
reasonable argument against data sharing that overrides
the benefits for the patients of data sharing. It is not
even a problem for the academics’ careers, in fact quite
the contrary. International calls for data sharing have
noted that data sharing should be valued when judging
the performance of academics, and leading journal edi-
tors, members of the International Committee of Medi-
cal Journal Editors, have agreed that posting trial results
in tabular forms in the same register where the investi-
gators registered their trial will not prevent them from
publishing the results in journals [115].
Academics must ensure that they have complete
access to all data, which is very rarely the case for
industry-sponsored trials despite claims to the contrary
in published papers, for there to be genuine research
partnerships, and they should not put their names to
publications if this is not the case.
Necessary legislation
It has been amply documented that guidelines and other
voluntary agreements about data sharing do not work.
Gøtzsche Trials 2011, 12:249
http://www.trialsjournal.com/content/12/1/249
Page 7 of 14
For example, although the PLoS journals require of
authors that, ‘data should be made freely available upon
reasonable request,’ researchers who asked ten authors
for their data, not to challenge their original conclu-
sions, but to test a new hypothesis, only obtained one
original data set [116].
If national or supranational legislation impedes the
much-needed reforms, the laws should be changed, har-
monizing national laws. The EU legislated in 2009 that
‘protocol-related information’ and all results from trials
in children must be made publicly available no more
than six months after the trial ended and must be sub-
mitted electronically [70]. It would be unreasonable to
defend a position that only details on trials in children
and not those on trials in adults must be made publicly
available.
Data sharing should mean that the data can be used
for whatever purpose other researchers might find rele-
vant, without needing to obtain permission from those
who assembled the data. This is in agreement with the
views expressed by the OECD, the European Commis-
sion and the US CDC [66-68,70,79]. Further, there
should be no restrictions, for example no requirement
of co-authorship as a condition for receiving data [78],
apart from those that may be needed to prevent identifi-
cation of particular patients, which is rarely a problem,
as patients are listed by their trial numbers only.
Data access must be free of charge. When Statistics
Canada attempted to recover costs for its data manage-
ment by charging data users, the use of these public
data decreased dramatically [67]. User fees would
impede research particularly much in low-income
countries.
Registration of clinical trials is already a legal require-
ment in some countries including the US and Brazil
[62]. All clinical trials involving humans must be regis-
tered at a public register, for example the WHO regis-
ter, http://www.who.int/trialsearch[62], or the US http://
www.clinicaltrials.gov, before the first trial participant is
recruited. Registration should include:
1) The full clinical trial protocol and any subsequent
amendments, with dates. This will allow other research-
ers to assess whether manipulations with the data have
occurred during data analysis and report writing. Such
manipulations, and many other important discrepancies
between protocols and published reports, are very com-
mon [117]. A cohort study of 102 clinical trials, many of
them multinational drug trials, showed that at least one
primary outcome was changed in two-thirds of the cases
between the protocol and the publication, and this was
not mentioned in any of the publications [16]. It is
deceptive to make changes in primary outcomes without
telling the readers about it, as the target is moved after
the results are known. In line with the European
ombudsman’s observations [90], we did not find any
information that could compromise commercial inter-
ests in trial protocols of industry-initiated trials [16].
2) The clinical record forms. These are very impor-
tant, as the obtained results depend on the way ques-
tions are being asked and recorded [11,118].
3) Any separate agreements between sponsor and
investigators that are not included in the protocol, for
example on finances, ownership of data and publication
rights. Thirteen of 44 protocols of industry-initiated
trials from 2004 referred to a separate publication agree-
ment, compared with none of 44 protocols from 1994-
1995, and none of these agreements were submitted to
the Scientific-Ethical Committees [106].
Clauses in trial protocols that give the sponsor owner-
ship of the data, or state that manuscripts need to be
approved by the sponsor, should be made illegal. As
contract law trumps every other form of law, informed
consent forms should be written as a contract that states
explicitly that the public owns the collected data; that all
data will be made available to the public in an anon-
ymized fashion; and that the data can be used for other
purposes than for meeting the trial’s objectives. This
should not be a problem, as it has always been an impli-
cit understanding when patients volunteer for trials that
the data may be used for additional purposes, and many
of these spin-off projects were not even thought about
when the trial was planned.
Similarly, data sharing for old trials do not violate the
patients’ rights or interests. It should therefore not be
required that patients be asked whether they accept that
old data be shared with other researchers, which would
make a lot of potentially fruitful research impracticable.
It should be a legal requirement to provide all results
and raw data within an appropriate period of time,
which, in accordance with most calls for data sharing,
should be no later than 12 months after the randomized
phase of the trial ended [69,70,73-75]. These data should
be made available in publicly administered data reposi-
tories, preferably the trial register (if not, there must be
a link from the register to the repository). If needed for
using the data, they must be accompanied by the statis-
tical codes. Raw data about adverse events should mean
the original descriptions, exactly as reported narratively
by patients or researchers on the case report forms,
before any coding or adjudication has taken place for
categorization purposes.
Drug regulatory agencies should be required to make
available the protocol, the clinical study report, separate
agreements, and the raw data on their website. With
rare exceptions, a drug should not be launched until
these data have been available for 12 months, enabling
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doctors, patients and those who consider whether to
reimburse the drug with taxpayers’ money to have their
own look at the data [119].
Research ethics committees should require registration
of trials as a precondition for ethics approval, and
should ensure that all trial results, protocols, separate
agreements, and raw data are publicly disseminated and
registered with the committees that approved the trial
no later than 12 months after the trial ended.
Research ethics committees should also require a sys-
tematic review of similar previous trials in the applica-
tion, as the UK National Institute for Health Research
does [120], and as the Danish ethics committees
required in 1997 [121,122]. A summary of relevant sys-
tematic reviews should be made available to trial partici-
pants [123]. It is impossible to know whether a
proposed trial is redundant without such a review,
which might need to be updated while the trial is run-
ning, as new evidence could render continuation of the
trial unethical.
There are numerous examples of unethical research
where one group received placebo, although a systematic
review would have shown that the studied treatment was
life saving, for example antibiotic prophylaxis for colon
surgery, thrombolysis for myocardial infarction and apro-
tinin for perioperative bleeding [123-126]. Previous, rele-
vant trials are often omitted from published reports of
trials. For example, in the published reports of placebo-
controlled trials with aprotinin, only 20% of previous
trials were cited, and only 15% of the reports cited the
largest trial, which was 28 times larger than the median
trial size [126]. A study from 2011 that included 227
meta-analyses of 1,523 trials published between 1963 and
2004 showed that fewer than 25% of the previous trials
had been cited [127]. This suggests that most previous
trials have also been omitted from the trial protocols
because if they had been cited, there would be no reason
not to cite them also in the trial report.
The data must be made accessible in electronic for-
mats wherever they are stored. Access must be easy and
it should be easy to work with the documents. Access
only to tens of thousands of pages of paper is an unac-
ceptable obstacle to the progress of clinical research.
Sanctions
The British House of Commons Health Committee
examined the drug industry in detail in 2004 to 2005
and found that its influence was enormous and out of
control [113,119]. However, although the Members of
Parliament felt that the UK Medicines Agency was not
competent to undertake its duties as a guardian of pub-
lic health, the Government declined a public hearing.
Many violations of the law in the context of clinical
research or marketing have been documented
[11,38-41,92,107,110,111,128-137]. A 2010 study showed
that the drug industry was the biggest defrauder of the
US Government under the False Claims Act and that
the civil and criminal settlements had increased drama-
tically in the past five years [138].
Pfizer agreed in 2009 to pay US$2.3 billion to settle
charges of fraud and civil and criminal liability over its
promotion of off-label use of four drugs [139]. The US
Department of Justice said it was the largest healthcare
fraud settlement in the Department’s history and the
largest criminal fine ever. Even so, this was reported to
be equivalent to less than three weeks of Pfizer sales. As
part of the settlement, Pfizer entered a corporate integ-
rity agreement with the Office of the Inspector General
of the Department of Health and Human Services to
avoid and detect such problems. Pfizer previously
entered three such agreements [139].
Violations of a new law about data sharing should
therefore result in more tangible measures if they are to
have any effect. I suggest that those who violate the law,
whether it be companies, research groups or individual
researchers, receive a fine corresponding to 10% of last
year’s gross income before taxes, and will be prohibited
from doing clinical research in the jurisdiction involved,
for example in all EU countries if the violation occurred
in one of them, for an appropriate period of time, for
example two years for first-time offenders.
In serious cases, or if repeated violations occur, or if
the lack of compliance with the law is not remedied
within a certain period of time, the sanctions should be
more severe, including the possibility of suspending the
marketing authorization, if the violation concerns a mar-
keted drug or medical device.
Any violation of the law should also mean that new
projects from the same sponsors or researchers cannot
be approved by the research ethics committees until all
data from previous studies have been made public.
Conclusion
Data sharing in clinical research is recommended by
many of the world’s leading scientific institutions and
policy makers, most recently also by The Cochrane Col-
laboration [140]. It is a moral imperative and we should
act now, as it will empower citizens and convey tremen-
dous scientific, economic, and social benefits [67].
Guidelines exist on how this can be done without com-
promising patient anonymity [141].
Appendix 1. Recent international calls for data
sharing
In 2004, The Ministerial Summit on Health Research in
Mexico City stated that, ‘Research results must be pub-
lished, documented in internationally accessible registers
and archives, and synthesized through systematic
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reviews. These actions can help to inform decisions
about support for new research and to build public con-
fidence in science’ [62]. The Summit called for action by
‘All major stakeholders, facilitated by the WHO Secre-
tariat, to establish a platform linking a network of inter-
national clinical trials registers to ensure a single point
of access and the unambiguous identification of trials.’
In 2008, the Global Ministerial Forum on Research
For Health in Bamako agreed ‘To develop, set, and
enforce standards, regulations, and best practices for
fair, accountable, and transparent research processes’
and ‘the registration and results reporting of clinical
trials, and open and equitable access to research data,
tools, and information’ [62,63].
In 2010, the World Bank announced that it would
make its data base open access, and would adopt disclo-
sure as the default position for both data and docu-
ments relating to lending [64].
In 2010, the WHO noted that, ‘public accountability
of research is not keeping pace with best practices,’ and
lamented that, ‘The opportunity of creating a shared fra-
mework for storing and sharing research data, tools and
materials has not been seized with the same energy in
the area of health as it has in other scientific fields, and
policy-makers are neither contributing to research prio-
rities nor using evidence to inform their decisions’ [65].
The WHO recommended sharing research data and
having open access to the results, partly because failure
to obtain it can be literally fatal [61].
The OECD declared in a 2004 report that, ‘Co-ordi-
nated efforts at national and international levels are
needed to broaden access to data from publicly funded
research,’ recognizing that, ‘open access to, and unrest-
ricted use of, data promotes scientific progress and facil-
itates the training of researchers,’ and that, ‘open access
will maximise the value derived from public investments
in data collection efforts’ by being ‘put to use for multi-
ple research purposes by many research institutes of the
global science system, thereby substantially increasing
the scope and scale of research,’ seeking ‘transparency in
regulations and policies,’ and ‘reducing unnecessary bar-
riers to the international exchange of these data’ [66].
These principles were set into perspective in a journal
article [67].
The European Commission refers to the OECD
declaration [66], stating in 2007 that, ‘Fully publicly
funded research data should in principle be accessible to
all’ [68]. It aims to ‘maximise the socio-economic bene-
fits of research and development for the public good’
and recognizes the need for access not only to journal
articles but also to research data, which would help
accelerate innovation and avoid duplication of research
efforts. The Commission furthermore notes that, ‘The
public purse pays for research, peer review (through
reviewers’ salaries), and journals (for example through
library budgets). It is natural that public actors should
request a better return on their investment.’ It is envi-
saged, but not yet implemented, that the EudraCT Clini-
cal Trials Database - where all EU drug trials must be
registered - should also contain the results, within 12
months after the termination of the trial, in accordance
with article 57(2) of regulation (EC) No 726/2004 and
its implementing guideline 2008/C168/02 [70].
The UK’s Medical Research Council policy [71] builds
on the OECD principles [66], acknowledging that pub-
licly-funded research data are a public good, produced
in the public interest, which should be openly available
to the maximum extent possible.
Similarly, the Wellcome Trust believes that, ‘success in
maximizing the value of research data depends crucially
on fostering a culture in which both data generators and
data users adopt good research practice, and act with
integrity and transparency in managing, using and shar-
ing research data’ [72]. It requires a data management
and sharing plan to be built into grant proposals when
‘the proposed research is likely to generate data outputs
that will hold significant value as a resource for the
wider research community. ‘
In 2007, the US Congress directed the NIH to require
sponsors to post the ‘basic’ results data from clinical
trials (other than phase 1 trials) on drugs that have been
approved by the FDA. The FDA required in 2007 that
the results of certain clinical trials be posted on the
internet within a year of the trial’s completion, even if
the results had not yet been published in a scientific
journal [73,74]. The law does not provide access to the
full study protocols and it does not cover trials com-
pleted before 27 September 2007 or trials of drugs that
were never approved [74].
In 2008, the US Congress approved the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, which gives the public access to the
published results of NIH-funded research. The policy
requires that these papers are accessible on the open,
publicly-owned resource, PubMed Central, no later than
12 months after publication [75].
The US NIH has declared that, ‘Data sharing is essen-
tial for expedited translation of research results into
knowledge, products and procedures to improve human
health’ [77]. In 2003, the NIH decided that all investiga-
tors seeking more than $500,000 in grant support per
year should make available their ‘final research data,
especially unique data ... to other investigators.’ Further-
more, ‘Data sharing should be timely and no later than
the acceptance for publication of the main findings from
the final dataset.’ Most importantly, NIH declared that,
‘When making data available, researchers cannot place
limits on questions or methods nor require coauthorship
as a condition for receiving data’[77]. About protecting
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the rights and privacy of human subjects, NIH wrote
that, ‘data sharing is possible without compromising
these efforts because identifiers can be removed from
data’ [77].
The US National Science Foundation has a data
archiving policy that is very similar to that of the NIH
being ‘committed to the principle that the various forms
of data collected with public funds belong in the public
domain,’ and noting that, ‘The purpose of this policy is
to advance science by encouraging data sharing among
researchers. Data sharing strengthens our collective
capacity to meet scientific standards of openness by pro-
viding opportunities for further analysis, replication, ver-
ification and refinement of research findings’ [78].
The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) ‘believes that public health and scientific advance-
ment are best served when data are released to, or shared
with, other public health agencies, academic researchers,
and appropriate private researchers in an open, timely,
and appropriate way. The interests of the public - which
include timely releases of data for further analysis - trans-
cends whatever claim scientists may believe they have to
ownership of data acquired or generated using federal
funds. Such data are, in fact, owned by the federal gov-
ernment and thus belong to the citizens of the United
States’ [79]. The CDC states what the advantages are of
data sharing [79]:
- improve the quality of CDC data and the consistency
of data across CDC,
- ensure that CDC scientists, contractors, awardees,
and grantees are held accountable for their findings,
- provide opportunities for study results to be
validated,
- uncover new areas for research,
- improve public health practitioners’ understanding of
various research methods,
- encourage analysts from other disciplines (for exam-
ple, economists, social scientists) to examine public
health questions, and
- build trust with outside partners and the public by
allowing an open critique of CDC investigations.
It also notes that, as a public health agency, CDC is
accountable to the public for the data it produces
through research, and CDC scientists are accountable
for their work, and their findings are subject to indepen-
dent validation. The principle is to release the data for
public use without restrictions within a year after the
data have been evaluated for quality and shared with
any partners in data collection.
In 2010, a number of funders, among them the WHO,
the World Bank, the US NIH, the US CDC, the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation and the Hewlett Foundation,
agreed on data sharing, as it would generate faster
progress in improving health, better value for money
and higher quality science [80].
Science notes that, ‘appropriate data sets ... must be
deposited in an approved database’ [81]. Nature journals
state that, ‘authors are required to make materials, data
and associated protocols promptly available to others
without preconditions. Data sets must be made freely
available to readers from the date of publication, and
must be provided to editors and peer-reviewers at sub-
mission, for the purposes of evaluating the manuscript’
[82].
The Lancet requires submission of the trial protocol in
addition to the trial report [83]; and the British Medical
Journal (BMJ) asks authors to include a data sharing
statement at the end of each original research article,
arguing that many people would call this a moral obliga-
tion because most research is publicly funded and
involves the public as participants [84].
Annals of Internal Medicine also has a data sharing
statement, and trials have been published for which the
study protocol, the raw data, and the statistical code
needed for analyzing the data are available on a website
[85].
The Public Library of Science (PLoS) journals, which
are open access journals, require that the underlying
data be made immediately available without restrictions
and encourage researchers to contact the editors if they
encounter difficulties in obtaining the data, in which
case the editors may post corrections on articles, contact
authors’ institutions and funders, and in extreme cases
withdraw publication [86].
In 2004, The Cochrane Collaboration recommended
legislation to mandate prospective registration of trials
in a register as a condition of funding, ethics and regula-
tory approval to ensure that all trial results become pub-
licly available [87]. In October 2011, The Cochrane
Collaboration published a statement calling for all data
from all randomised clinical trials, including raw anon-
ymised individual participant data, to become publicly
available free of charge and in easily accessible electro-
nic formats [140].
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